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1Artificial-Noise-Aided Secure Transmission with
Directional Modulation based on Random
Frequency Diverse Arrays
Jinsong Hu, Shihao Yan, Member, IEEE, Feng Shu, Member, IEEE, Jiangzhou Wang, Fellow, IEEE,
Jun Li, Senior Member, IEEE, and Yijin Zhang Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, a random frequency diverse array
based directional modulation with artificial noise (RFDA-DM-
AN) scheme is proposed to enhance physical layer security of
wireless communications. Specifically, we first design the RFDA-
DM-AN scheme by randomly allocating frequencies to transmit
antennas, thereby achieving two-dimensionally (i.e., angle and
range) secure transmissions, and outperforming the state-of-the-
art one-dimensional (i.e., angle) phase array (PA) based DM
scheme. Then we derive the closed-form expression of a lower
bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) of our RFDA-DM-
AN scheme. Based on the theoretical lower bound derived, we
further optimize the transmission power allocation between the
useful signal and artificial noise (AN) in order to improve the
ESC. Simulation results show that 1) our RFDA-DM-AN scheme
achieves a higher secrecy capacity than that of the PA based
DM scheme, 2) the lower bound derived is shown to approach
the ESC as the number of transmit antennas N increases and
precisely matches the ESC when N is sufficiently large, and 3)
the proposed optimum power allocation achieves the highest ESC
of all power allocations schemes in the RFDA-DM-AN.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, directional modulation,
frequency diverse array, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A
S a promising physical layer security technique, direc-
tional modulation (DM) has attracted extensive studies
due to its unique characteristic. This characteristic is that
DM projects modulated signals into a predetermined spatial
direction while simultaneously distorting the constellation of
these signals in all other directions. This can significantly
decrease the probability of these signals being eavesdropped
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on. As such, the DM technique is an ideal candidate to
achieve physical layer security [1–9]. In general, there are
two main types of methods to implement the DM technique in
wireless communications. The first one is to adopt DM on the
radio frequency (RF) frontend (e.g., [10–13]). For example,
[10, 11] obtained the phase and amplitude of DM signal at
the predefined direction through varying the effective length
and scattering property of a reflector. A similar approach
was proposed in [12, 13], where the phase of each antenna
element was shifted accordingly in order to construct the
DM signal. However, the flexibility of implementing DM on
the RF frontend is limited, which leads to high complexity
in the design of constellation diagram for DM. Against this
background, the second method was developed in the literature
(e.g., [14]), which implemented the DM technique on the
baseband instead of on the RF frontend. Specifically, an
approach to apply the DM technique on the baseband based
on an orthogonal vector was proposed in [14]. In addition, [15,
16] provided a robust baseband DM algorithm by considering
estimation errors on the direction angles. Compared with the
design in the RF frontend, it is more efficient to realize DM
technique on the baseband by utilizing beamforming operation
and adding the artificial noise, thereby enabling dynamic DM
transmissions to send the different patterns of a constellation
point at different time slots. Therefore, implementing DM on
baseband can make eavesdroppers hard to track and decode
useful signals, thus can further improve physical layer security.
The DM technique can be achieved by phase array (PA)
[12–14]. Considering security, previous studies on the DM
technique only investigated the system where a legitimate user
locates at the desired direction and an eavesdropper locates in
another direction (that is different from the desired direction).
However, it is common to assume that the location informa-
tion of the eavesdropper is not available at the transmitter
in the context of physical layer security. The eavesdropper
may be passive and never transmit signals, thus means it
is hard to obtain such location information. Considering a
realistic scenario, an eavesdropper may exactly locates in the
desired direction as the legitimate user. In this scenario, the
aforementioned DM based on PA can no longer guarantee the
secure transmission for the legitimate user. This is due to the
fact that the DM based on PA can only distort signals at the
directions that are different from the desired one.
A linear frequency diverse array (LFDA) in [17–19] creates
new possibilities for DM to guarantee a secure transmission
2in the aforementioned scenario where the legitimate user
and eavesdropper locate in the same direction (but different
ranges). This is due to the fact that LFDA can produce a
beam-pattern with controllable direction and range, by linearly
shifting the carrier frequencies across different transmit anten-
nas. However, as discussed in [18, 19], the direction and range
achieved by LFDA are coupled. This means that there may
exist multiple direction-range pairs at which the eavesdropper
can receive identical signals as the legitimate user, which com-
promises the secure transmission. Recently, [20, 21] developed
a new type of frequency diverse array, namely the random
frequency diverse array (RFDA), of which each transmit
antenna is randomly (instead of linearly) allocated a narrow
band frequency or subchannel frequency [22–24]. As shown
in [20, 21], RFDA owns one property that it can decouple the
correlation between the direction and range (this correlation
exists in LFDA and cannot be decoupled). This property
enables RFDA to be a good candidate for DM to achieve a
robust secure transmission (i.e., physical layer security). In [3],
the authors discussed two main metrics, i.e., ergodic secrecy
capacity (ESC) and secrecy outage probability, which are often
adopted to measure the performance of secure transmissions
over fading channels. ESC applies for delay tolerant systems
which allows for the adoption of an ergodic version of fading
channels. On the other hand, secrecy outage probability, which
measures systems with probabilistic formulations, is more
appropriate for scenario under stringent delay constraints. In
our work, the instantaneous value of the secrecy capacity at the
eavesdropper is not available due to the strategies of randomly
allocating frequencies to the transmit antennas in the proposed
scheme. Averaging over all the realizations of the frequencies
allocation, we can capture the ergodic features of the secrecy
capacity. The concept of ESC bears the similar significance to
the one adopted in this paper.
In this work, for the first time, we utilize the DM with
artificial noise based on RFDA (referred to as the RFDA-DM-
AN scheme) to enhance physical layer security of wireless
communications. Due to the fact that RFDA can decouple the
correlation between the range and angle, the proposed RFDA-
DM-AN scheme can significantly outperform the PA-DM-AN
and LFDA-DM-AN schemes in terms of secrecy capacity. In
this scheme, in addition to maximizing the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) of useful signals at the desired direction, the transmitter
also sends artificial noise (AN) in all other directions to cause
interferences to the eavesdropper. In order to fully examine
the secrecy performance of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme, we
first derive a lower bound on its ESC. Based on this lower
bound, we can determine the optimal transmit power allocation
between the useful signal and AN more efficiently relative
to using the ESC. As shown in the simulation, this lower
bound is in agreement with the ESC when the number of
transmit antennas is sufficiently large, which confirms the
validity and effectiveness of using this lower bound to perform
transmit power allocation. Moreover, the proposed optimum
power allocation achieves the highest ESC compared with
other power allocations in the RFDA-DM-AN. In addition, we
investigate two strategies of randomly allocating frequencies to
































Fig. 1. The structure of the random frequency diverse array.
based on the continuous and discrete uniform distributions).
The simulation results demonstrate that the continuous unifor-
m frequency allocation outperforms the discrete one in terms
of average ESC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we detail our system model for the RFDA-DM-AN
scheme. Then the secrecy performance of the RFDA-DM-AN
scheme is analyzed in Section III, based on which the transmit
power and frequency allocations are examined. The secrecy
performance of the proposed scheme is numerically evaluated
in Section IV, and Section V draws conclusions.
Notations: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number,
| · | and (·)∗ denote the modulus and conjugation, respectively.
Given a complex vector or matrix, (·)T , (·)H , tr(·), and ∥ · ∥
denote the transpose, conjugate transpose, trace, and norm,
respectively. The N ×N identity matrix is referred to as IN
and E[·] denotes expectation operation.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Random Frequency Diverse Array
As shown in Fig. 1, the RFDA is different from the PA (i.e.,
phased array) due to the use of frequency increment across the
antenna elements at the transmitter. The frequency allocated
to the n-th element is given by
fn = fc + kn∆f, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (1)
where fc is the central carrier frequency and ∆f is the
frequency increment. In the RFDA, all the kn are chosen as in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
The distribution of kn, which determines one specific random
mapping rule to assign the carrier frequencies of the different
elements, is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this work, we consider
a uniform linear array (ULA) at the transmitter and set the
phase reference at the array geometric center. The range of
the receiver for the n-th element is denoted as Rn. In practice,
the location of receiver is assumed far from the antenna array,
and thus Rn can be approximated as
Rn = R− bnd cos θ, n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (2)
where θ and R are the angle and range from receiver to the
transmitter, d denotes the element spacing of the ULA at the
transmitter, and bn is given by
bn = n− N − 1
2
. (3)
Note that in the LFDA the value kn is equal to bn, which is
a linear function of n [17, 18].
The phase of the transmit signal at the reference element of

























Then, the phase shift of the n-th element relative to the














Note that the second term in (6) is of importance, because it
shows that the radiation pattern of the array depends on both
the range and the frequency increment. Normally, the relation-
ship between frequency increment and carrier frequency can
guarantee N∆f ≪ fc, and element spacing d is close to the
wave length λ (e.g. d = λ/2). As such, the third term in (6) is















Fig. 2. Illustration of constellation diagram in DM system for the QPSK
modulation.
Then, the normalized steering vector of RFDA to a specific




[ejΨ0(θ,R), ejΨ1(θ,R),. . ., ejΨN−1(θ,R)]T . (8)
B. Directional Modulation with Artificial Noise
Since DM is a transmitter-side technology, this work con-
siders a multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel
as shown in Fig. 2. In this wiretap channel, the transmitter
(Alice) is equipped with N antennas, the legitimate user (Bob)
is equipped with a single antenna, and the eavesdropper (Eve)
is equipped with a single antenna. We assume that the location
of Bob, denoted by (θB , RB), is available at Alice, while the
location of Eve, denoted by (θE , RE), is unavailable at Alice
(which potentially exists in anywhere). In addition, free space
channel model has been widely adopted in the literature for
the DM technique (e.g., [14–16]). Without loss of generality,
we normalize the channel gain to be one.
Beamforming with AN has been widely used in the context
of physical layer security due to its robustness and desirable
secrecy performance [25, 26]. Therefore, for the first time, we
adopt the AN-aided secure transmission in the DM technique
based on RFDA. Considering beamforming with AN, the






where x is a symbol chosen from the complex signal constel-
lation with average power constraint (i.e., E[|x|2] = 1). Ps
4is the transmit power of Alice and α is the parameter that
determines the power allocation between the useful signal and
AN. In addition, v is the beamforming vector for the useful
signal. Since Alice does not know Eve’s location, in order to
maximize the SNR at Bob, v is given by
v = h(θB , RB), (10)
where h(θB , RB) is the steering vector of the RFDA at
Alice to Bob, which can be obtained by replacing (θ,R)
with (θB , RB) in (8). Furthermore, the artificial noise vector
w in (9) should lie in the null space of h(θB , RB) (i.e.,
h
H(θB , RB)w = 0) in order to avoid interference to Bob.
As such, w can be expressed as [15]
w =
(IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB , RB))z
∥(IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB , RB))z∥ . (11)
where z consists of N i.i.d. circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance,
i.e., z ∼ CN (0, IN ).
Following (9), the received signal at Bob is given by
y(θB , RB) = h




H(θB , RB)vx+ nB
=
√
αPsx+ nB , (12)
where nB is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN),
distributed as nB ∼ CN (0, σ2B). As shown in (12), Bob can
restore the original signal x from Alice easily without knowing
the random mapping rule. To be fair, we assume that Eve
cannot obtain this random mapping rule. Following (12), the




= αµB , (13)
where µB = Ps/σ
2
B .
Likewise, the received signal at Eve can be expressed as
y(θE , RE) = h




H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)x
+
√
(1− α)PshH(θE , RE)w + nE , (14)
where nE is the AWGN with the distribution nE ∼ CN (0, σ2E)
and h(θE , RE) is the steering vector of the RFDA at Alice to
Eve, which can be obtained by replacing (θ,R) with (θE , RE)
in (8).
As per (14), the item
√
Psh
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB) distorts
the amplitude and phase of the signals at Eve. In addition,
the item hH(θE , RE)w is nonzero since h
H(θE , RE) is not
orthogonal with w. This further distorts the constellation of x
at Eve.
Following (14), the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at Eve is given by
γE =
αPs|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2
(1− α)Ps|hH(θE , RE)w|2 + σ2E
=
αµB |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2






III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE RFDA-DM-AN
SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the
RFDA-DM-AN scheme. Specifically, we first determine its
ESC and then derive a lower bound on this ESC. Based on
this lower bound, we determine the optimal power allocation
between the useful signal and AN. Then, two strategies of
randomly allocating frequencies to the transmit antennas are
studied.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
In the context of physical layer security, the secrecy capacity
is defined as {0, CB−CE}+, where CB is the capacity at Bob,
which is given by
CB = log2(1 + γB), (17)
and CE is the capacity at Eve, which is given by
CE = log2(1 + γE). (18)
In the considered system model without path loss CB ≥ CE
can be guaranteed, since γB is the maximized by Alice.
The ESC is commonly used for the fading channel with
statistical channel state information at the transmitter. In
general, the ESC is defined as the instantaneous secrecy
capacity averaged over γB and/or γE . From (13), γB does
not depend on the frequency allocation at the RFDA (i.e., the
values of kn). However, in (15) γE is a function of kn since
both h(θB , RB) and h(θE , RE) are functions of kn. As the
distribution of kn is available at Alice (the transmitter), we
adopt the ESC, which is obtained by averaging the secrecy
capacity over γE , as the main performance metric to evaluate
the secrecy performance of different schemes. We would like
to mention that the randomness in γE is caused by the
random frequency allocation instead of the fading in our work.
Accordingly, this ESC is given by
C = E [CB − CE ] = CB − E [CE ] . (19)
Note that this ESC C is dependent on a specific location of
Eve. However, as assumed in this work, Alice does not know
Eve’s location. As such, we define C as the average value of C
over all possible locations of Eve, which is determined by the
region where Eve potentially exists. For example, the location
of Eve can be assumed at an annular region centered on the
location of Bob, which is similar to the annulus threat model







Cf(θE , RE)dθEdRE , (20)
where f(θE , RE) is the joint probability density function (pdf)
of θE and RE in the sets Θ and R, respectively. Then,
5the optimal value of the power allocation parameter α that




In order to efficiently determine α∗, we have to derive
a closed-form expression for C. However, due to the high
complexity of γE as shown in (15), the closed-form expression
for C is mathematically intractable (not to mention the closed-
form expression for C). In order to facilitate the power
allocation, we derive a lower bound on the ESC C in the
following subsection.
B. A Lower Bound on the Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
A lower bound on the ESC C is derived in the following
theorem in order to facilitate the transmit power allocation
between the useful signal and AN at Alice.




−α2µ2B + αµB(βF + µB−1) + βF + µB







η(N2 −N(1− Φ2(j2pip)) + S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip))
, (23)
q ,













IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB , RB)
]2}
, (27)
and Φ(·) is the moment generating function (MGF) of kn.
Proof: The cross correlation coefficient between
h(θE , RE) and h(θB , RB) is
h
















In (28), only the parameter q, p, and kn are of interest since
they are functions of the location information and the random
frequency allocation. Then, to proceed we define
ρ(q, p, kn) , h
H(θE , RE)h(θB , RB). (29)
The mean of |ρ(q, p, kn)|2 over kn is derived as








































































[N(1− Φ2(j2pip)) + S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip)], (30)
where g(kn) is the pdf of kn in the set K.
Next, we can derive the lower bound of the ESC C by using
the Jensen’s inequality, i.e., log2 E[x] ≥ E[log2 x]. Then, using
(15) we have
C = CB − E[CE ]





[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2]
(1− α)µBE [|hH(θE , RE)w|2] + β
)
a




αµBEkn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|2]


















H(θE , RE)P(θB , RB)E[zz
H ]
P(θB , RB)E[zzH ]
P









H(θE , RE)P(θB , RB)IN
P(θB , RB)IN
P





[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2]
tr{[IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB , RB)]2}
= η(1− Ekn
[|ρ(q, p, kn)|2]), (32)
where P(θB , RB), IN − h(θB , RB)hH(θB , RB). Note that
z ∼ CN (0, IN ), and b= is obtained based on E[zzH ] = IN .
6From (31), after some algebraic manipulations we obtain
the lower bound as given by (22), which completes the proof
of this theorem.
We note that the results provided in Theorem 1 is valid
for arbitrary values of N . Due to the distance concen-
tration phenomenon [28], we know that |ρ(q, p, kn)|2 ap-
proaches its mean Ekn
[|ρ(q, p, kn)|2] when N → ∞,
i.e., |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2 in (15) approaches its mean
Ekn
[|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)|2] when N →∞. As such, we
can conclude that the lower bound approaches the ESC when
N →∞. Therefore, we next determine the expression of the
ESC when N →∞ in the following corollary.





−α2µ2B + αµB(βF∞ + µB−1) + βF∞ + µB







η(N2 − S2N (q)Φ2(j2pip))
. (34)
Proof: The value of Ekn




= E2kn [ρ(q, p, kn)] + Vkn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|]. (35)
As N →∞, we will have Vkn [|ρ(q, p, kn)|]→ 0 due to the



























Then, substituting (36) into (31) and performing some algebra-
ic manipulations, we can obtain the asymptotic ESC as given
in (33). This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
Similar to (20), we can determine the average value of CLB






f(θB , RB)CLBdθBdRB . (37)





C. Continuous and Discrete Uniform Frequency Allocations
We note that the lower bound derived in Theorem 1 is
valid for any MGF of kn, i.e., for any random frequency
allocation method. In this paper, we consider the continuous
uniform and discrete uniform frequency allocations, in which
kn follows a continuous uniform distribution and a discrete
uniform distribution, respectively. The MGF of a continuous
uniform random variable t is given by
Φ(t) =
eat − ebt
t(a− b) , (39)
where t ∈ [a, b]. Therefore, when kn is a continuous uniform





j2pip − eM2 j2pip






where M is determined by the total available frequency
bandwith for the antenna array at Alice.




K(1− et) , (41)
where K is the number of all possible values of t subject to
t ∈ [a, b]. As such, when kn is within a discrete uniform set











By substituting (40) and (42) into Theorem 1, we can
obtain the lower bound on the secrecy capacity C for the
continuous uniform frequency allocation and discrete uniform
frequency allocation, respectively. Accordingly, we can obtain
the secrecy performance of these two frequency allocations,
which will be evaluated in the following section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the secrecy perfor-
mance of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme with the PA-DM-AN
and LFDA-DM-AN schemes as benchmarks. Without other
notes, our system settings used in this section are as follows.
The carrier frequency fc is set to 1 GHz (i.e., fc = 1GHz), the
frequency increment is set to 3 MHz (i.e., ∆f = 3MHz), the
element spacing is half of the wavelength (i.e., d = c/2fc),
the location of Bob is set at (45◦, 120 m), and β = 1.
Fig. 3 plots the ESC of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme and
secrecy capacities of the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN
schemes versus µB for a specific location of Eve. Note that this
Eve’s location is only for the performance evaluation, which is
unknown to Alice. As expected, it can be seen that the secrecy
capacity of the PA-DM-AN scheme is zero since Eve is in
the same direction as Bob relative to Alice. In addition, the


























Fig. 3. The ergodic secrecy capacity of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme and
secrecy capacities of the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN schemes versus
µB , where N = 32, Eve’s location is (45
◦, 239 m), and α = 0.5.
secrecy capacity of the LFDA-DM-AN scheme is much lower
than the ESC of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme, especially when
µB is large. This indicates that our proposed RFDA-DM-AN
scheme can significantly outperform both the PA-DM-AN and
LFDA-DM-AN schemes. It can be seen that Eve may select
the locations (not the same as Bob’s location) that guarantee a
zero secrecy capacity in the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-AN
schemes, since Eve may know Alice’s location in practice.
However, there are no such locations that Eve can select to
ensure a zero ESC in the RFDA-DM-AN scheme. This is due
to the fact that RFDA can decouple the correlation between
the range and angle in DM, which is detailed in the following
figure.
Fig. 4 plots the absolute value of the correlation coef-
ficient between h(θE , RE) and h(θB , RB) in the PA-DM-
AN, LFDA-DM-AN, and RFDA-DM-AN schemes in order
to further explain the observations seen in Fig. 3. It can
be seen from Fig. 4 (a), the maximum values (i.e., yellow
areas) of this coefficient |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| appear in
the direction of Bob, which means that if Eve exists along
the desired direction, the secrecy capacity is zero (i.e., the
received signals at Bob and Eve are identical). This explains
why the secrecy capacity of the PA-DM-AN scheme is zero
in Fig. 3. As shown in Fig. 4 (b), the maximum values
of |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| appear periodically around Bob’s
location, which demonstrates that the range and angle are
coupled in this scheme. The periodical peak values indicate
that the LFDA-DM-AN scheme may not achieve positive
secrecy capacity even when Eve is not at the same location.
In Fig. 4 (c), we observe that the unique maximum value of
|hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| only occurs at the location of Bob,
which means that a positive ESC can be achieved as long as
Eve is not at the location of Bob. In practice, if Eve locates
at the same location as Bob, Bob can inform Alice about
this information in order to avoid Eve’s attacks. As such,
the aforementioned observations intuitively demonstrate the
Fig. 4. |hH(θE , RE)h(θB , RB)| of the PA-DM-AN, LFDA-DM-AN, and
RFDA-DM-AN schemes, where N = 32.















































Fig. 5. C¯ and C¯LB of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme versus α, where µB =
15dB.
advantages of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme.
Fig. 5 illustrates the average value of the ESC, i.e., C,
and the average value of the lower bound on the ESC, i.e.,
CLB , versus α. For this figure, the potential location of Eve
is uniformly distributed at [0◦, 44◦]
∪
[46◦, 180◦] in angle and
[0 m, 119 m]
∪
[121 m, 250 m] in range. From Fig. 5, we first
observe that the gap between C and CLB decreases as the
number of antennas at Alice (i.e., N) increases. When N is
sufficiently large (e.g., N = 256), we can see CLB precisely
matches C, which can be explained by our Corollary 1. When
N is not very large (e.g., N = 16), we can see that the
optimal value of α determined based on CLB is still close
to that determined based on C. This demonstrates the validity
of using CLB as an approximation of C to determine the
transmit power allocation between the useful signal and AN
at Alice. The optimal α takes 0.62 (0.68), 0.76 (0.79), and
1 (1) for N = 8, 16, and 256, respectively, thus means that
the optimal power allocation factor α increases as the number
of antennas N increases and approaches one when N is very
large. This demonstrates that Alice does not have to transmit
AN when N is sufficiently large, which is due to the fact that
Alice can construct an ultra-narrow beam towards Bob when
N is large enough to avoid information leakage to Eve. In
Fig. 6, we plot the exact and asymptotic ESCs versus different
values of N . In this figure, we can observe that the exact ESC
approaches the asymptotic one as N increases, which confirms
our Corollary 1.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy performance of the RFDA-DM-
AN scheme with continuous and discrete uniform frequency
allocations. As seen from Fig. 7, the continuous uniform
frequency allocation outperforms the discrete one in terms of
average ESC. The average ESC increases as µB increases,
which indicates that Alice can enhance physical layer security
through increasing her transmit power. Finally, we observe
that the optimal value of α that maximizes the average ESC
increases as µB decreases. This indicates that Alice allocates
a larger fraction of her transmit power to the useful signal as



























Fig. 6. The exact and asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity versus the different
values of N , where µB = 15dB.






























Fig. 7. Average ergodic secrecy capacity of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme with
continuous and discrete uniform frequency allocations, where N = 16 and
M = 10.
her transmit power decreases, and she allocates all her transmit
power to the useful signal (i.e., α = 1) when her transmit
power is sufficiently low as shown in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel DM scheme based on random fre-
quency diverse arrays with artificial noise is proposed to
enhance physical layer security of wireless communications.
By randomly allocating frequencies to transmit antennas, the
proposed RFDA-DM-AN achieves secure two-dimensional
(i.e., angle and range) transmission. A lower bound on the ESC
of the proposed method is derived. Using this lower bound,
the transmit power is efficiently allocated between the useful
signal and AN. Also, we derived an asymptotic ESC when
N approaches infinity, which is precisely consistent with our
derived lower bound when N is sufficiently large. Simulation
results show that: 1) the proposed RFDA-DM-AN scheme
9can significantly outperform the PA-DM-AN and LFDA-DM-
AN schemes in terms of secrecy capacity, 2) the proposed
optimum power allocation achieves the highest ESC among
all power allocations schemes in the RFDA-DM-AN, 3) the
optimal power allocation factor α increases as the number of
antennas N increases given a fixed transmit power, 4) it is
feasible to use CLB as an approximation of C to allocate the
transmit power between the useful signal and AN at Alice,
5) the continuous uniform frequency allocation can achieve a
higher average ESC compared to the discrete one. The RFDA-
DM-AN scheme proposed in this paper could be applied to
several future practical application scenarios including satellite
communications, unmanned aerial vehicle communications,
millimeter wave communications and so on.
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